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INTRODUCTION
The United States is known worldwide for its high quality, innovative goods and
services,1 and several businesses regularly export its products to other countries.2 Although most
products are not subject to export regulations, the government closely regulates several types of
exports.3 Academic literature has persistent and extensive discussions about what exports should
be regulated and what trade policies should govern such regulation.4 National security has long
been a reason why exports are regulated.5 For example, defense-related exports, or so-called
“dual-use” technologies—those that can be used in military and civil functions—have long been
1

Export Planning, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://apps.export.gov/article?id=why-export (last

visited Aug. 2, 209)
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

See, e.g., Robert E. Klitgaard & Richard Huff, Limiting Exports on National Security Grounds,

4 COMM’N ON THE ORG. OF THE GOV’T FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POL’Y 441 app. at 443
(1975) (“But critics of all stripes, as well as many officials now administering export controls,
agree on one thing: current policy and procedures are in a shambles”); see, e.g., Trey Herr &
Paul Rosenzweig, Cyber Weapons and Export Control: Incorporating Dual Use with the PrEP
Model, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 301, 320 (2016) (contemplating when malware becomes a
weapon of war).
5

See Jere W. Morehead & David A. Dismuke, Export Control Policies and National Security:

Protecting U.S. Interests in the New Millennium, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173, 186 (1999)
(“Controlling the export of such weapons and the technology to make them has been the
cornerstone of U.S. policy since the conclusion of World War II”).

1

regulated by U.S. export controls.6 However, in an era where technology develops so rapidly
beyond comprehension, and certainly beyond efficient regulation, emerging technologies have
become a moving target.
With China’s economic growth and Russia’s ever-looming threat, along with the recent
history of technological attacks, bad actors are empowered to use new technologies against the
U.S. Legal literature has discussed “emerging technologies” as a topic for a significant time.7
Articles often use the term to describe the concept that regulations should match the challenge of
meeting technology development.8 Technology is evolving so fast that it is no longer possible
for people to predict its future.9 In other words, technology will continue to develop at a fast
pace, and its regulation needs to keep up.
6

See infra note 42.

7

See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 LAW, INNOVATION &

TECH. 75, 92 (2009).
8

Id.

9

Chris Gulker, Technology is moving so fast that we can no longer reliably predict the future

even a few years ahead, INDEP. (March 10, 1998), https://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/technology-is-moving-so-fast-that-we-can-no-longer-reliably-predict-the-futureeven-a-few-years-1149323.html. It is a strange thought that this article was written before Apple
introduced the first iPhone, which ushered a new era of mobile technology. See Ben Gilbert, It’s
been over 12 years since the iPhone debuted–look how primitive the first one seems today, BUS.
INSIDER (July 22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/first-phone-anniversary-2016-12
(addressing how technology has developed since the first iPhone).

2

Emerging technologies are compromising our national security. For example, Russia
allegedly influenced the 2016 elections through Facebook’s data technology.10 China allegedly
committed cyberattacks against universities to steal research on naval technologies.11 Criminals
are committing local “ransomware” cyberattacks through Eternal Blue, a technology created by
the National Security Agency.12 Compromises in national security due to the proliferation and
malicious use of technologies have become a part of the regular news cycle. On a large scale,
people with malicious intent could use technology to crumble economic infrastructures, disrupt
social communications, or attack with technologically advanced military weapons.13

10

Julia Kollewe, Facebook Profit Likely to Fall After Fake News Privacy Scandals, GUARDIAN

(Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/22/facebook-profit-fall-fakenews-privacy-scandals.
11

Shannon Liao, Chinese hackers reportedly targeted 27 universities for military secrets, VERGE

(March 5, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/5/18251836/chinese-hackers-us serversuniversities-military-secrets-cybersecurity.
12

Patricia Mezzei, Hit by Ransomware Attack, Florida City Agrees to Pay Hackers $600,000,

N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/us/florida-riviera-beachhacking-ransom.html; Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A.
Tool Wreaks Havoc, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsahacking-tool-baltimore.html?module=inline.
13

See, e.g., Michael Griffin, The Dangers of Modern Technology, ODYSSEY (Aug. 18, 2015),

https://www.theodysseyonline.com/the-danger-in-modern-technology (commenting on the
dangers of technology in context of cyberattacks); see also, Max Boot, The Paradox of Military

3

Oracle Corporation is a prominent provider of business software that has a significant
role in the development of emerging technologies.14 Edward Screven, Chief Corporate Architect
of Oracle Corporation, noted the perils of working with data, “[W]e manage important data—
critical data—for tens of thousands of customers today in our data centers across the world. And
of course, there are a lot of bad actors out there, who would like to get to it, either to get the data,
or worse, try to change it.”15 Similar to the national security concern that cloud data centers
pose, other technologies, such as artificial intelligence, DNA manipulation, and 5G technology,
have critical security implications. But since regulation cannot simply stop innovation and the
development of technologies, identifying emerging technologies in a way that allows for
efficient regulation is a critical challenge. It is also difficult to clarify what dangers emerging
technologies could realistically have to national security.
Recently, in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019,16 Congress called upon the President and the heads of his agencies to establish a process in
which the heads of agencies conduct a regular, ongoing, process to identify “emerging and

Technology, NEW ATLANTIS J. OF TECH. & SOC’Y 13, 13–26 (2006),
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA14-Boot.pdf
(commenting on the U.S. dominance over various military technologies).
14

Oracle Fact Sheet, ORACLE (2019), http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/oracle-fact-sheet-

079219.pdf.
15

Emerging Technology Trends & National Security, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (March

25, 2019), https://www.csis.org/events/emerging-technology-trends-and-national-security.
16

50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019).

4

foundational technologies”17 that “are essential to the national security of the United States.”18
The Act failed to define what national security is in this context. However, it described what the
interagency process should take into account:19 the development of emerging technologies in
foreign countries, the effect of export controls on developing emerging technologies in the
United States, and the effectiveness of export controls in limiting the proliferation of emerging
technologies to foreign countries.20
In addition to these guidelines, the Act required a notice and comment period.21 The
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initiated an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment on defining and recognizing emerging
technologies that may have national security implications.22 The goal behind recognizing these
17

Id.

18

Id.

19

50 U.S.C. § 4817 (a)(2)(B).

20

Id.

21

50 U.S.C. § 4817 (a)(2)(C).

22

This comment period does not include identification of “foundational technologies,” for which

a separate advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) will take place. See Review of
Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201 (Nov. 19, 2018) (to be
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 744) (2018) (designating seven areas that comments should focus on:
“(1) How to define emerging technology to assist identification of such technology in the future;
(2) criteria to apply to determine whether there are specific technologies within these general
categories that are important to U.S. national security; (3) sources to identify such technologies;
(4) other general technology categories that warrant review to identify emerging technology that

5

emerging technologies is to make the export of such technologies subject to the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR) by placing that product on the Commerce Control List
(CCL).23 The ANPRM suggested fourteen broad categories to help identify emerging
technologies.24 Through this ANPRM the BIS seeks to add technologies to this list, and place
export controls on them.25 Currently, exports are controlled via the CCL, through which the
EAR, as a minimum control, issues licenses to exporters that want to ship an item on the CCL.26
The BIS seeks to add newly identified emerging technologies to the list, and impose, at a
minimum, a license control to the items on the CCL.27
are important to U.S. national security; (5) the status of development of these technologies in the
United States and other countries; (6) the impact specific emerging technology controls would
have on U.S. technological leadership; (7) any other approaches to the issue of identifying
emerging technologies important to U.S. national security, including the stage of development or
maturity level of an emerging technology that would warrant consideration for export control.”
23

See id; 15 C.F.R. §734 (2017).

24

15 C.F.R. § 744 (2018). The broad categories listed are biotechnology; artificial intelligence

and machine learning technology; position, navigation, and timing technology; microprocessor
technology; advanced computing technology; data analytics technology; quantum information
and sensing technology; logistics technology; additive manufacturing; robotics; braincomputer interfaces; hypersonics; advanced materials; and advanced surveillance technologies.
25

The ANPRM has now ended. Businesses and practitioners are still waiting for the Commerce

Department to publish new rules.
26

See infra PART TWO.

27

See 15 C.F.R. §744 (2018).

6

Regardless of what rules the BIS adopt, the scope of national security seems ill defined
and unclear.28 The BIS needs to publish additional guidance describing when national security is
implicated, with examples or realistic illustrations of national security being compromised that
could be effectively avoided through export regulations. Also, the technological and business
expertise of those who are attempting to adopt these regulations may be inadequate.29 There is a
fundamental disparity between the knowledge and expertise of the government and private
corporations.30 This process of adopting export regulations may hinder U.S. innovation and
market interests because of its broad designations that may require a lengthy licensing process.
Additionally, the process may also be too slow to react effectively and efficiently to technology’s
28

See Jay Stanley, How to Think About the National Security State, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Sept.

5, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/how-think-aboutnational-security-state?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security-criminal-lawreform/how-think-about-national-security (exploring why it is important to clearly understand
national security, suggesting that it enables people to keep the leaders in check); see also, Jay
Stanley, The National Security State: Why it’s Important to Understand the Nature of the Beast,
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Sept. 10, 2013, 3:48 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity/secrecy/national-security-state-why-its-important-understand-naturebeast?redirect=blog/criminal-law-reform-national-security-technology-and-liberty/nationalsecurity-state-why-its (commenting that there is a wall of secrecy behind which national security
agencies operate).
29

See generally, Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J.

CONST. L. 461 (2010) (discussing the role of expertise in bureaucracy).
30

Id.

7

rapid development because it may always involve a reevaluation of new technologies through a
comment period such as this one.
Part One of this Comment explains the definition of exports and the multiple agencies
that have regulations for exports; Part One also discusses the role of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in export controls. Part Two explains the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), its process of exports regulation, and the types of products it
currently controls. Part Three discusses the BIS’s ANPRM on emerging technologies, including
a brief discussion of comments made to the ANPRM. Part Four recommends a new rulemaking
period to define the policy of national security to supplement identifying emerging technologies.
Part Four also recommends creating a separate committee or agency to consolidate efforts in
identifying emerging technologies.
PART ONE: EXPLAINING EXPORTS
A.

Defining Exports

The EAR has defined exports on multiple facets.31 Included in the meaning of an export
is taking the item out of the country in any manner,32 and transferring “technology” or source
code to a foreign person in the United States is called a “deemed export.”33 Often situations arise
where an item subject to the EAR is transferred from one foreign country to another foreign
country.34 Such a transfer is called a “reexport.”35 Release of “technology” to a foreign person
31

15 C.F.R. §§ 734.13–734.18 (2017).

32

Id. at 734.13(a)(1).

33

Id. at 734.13(a)(2).

34

Id. at 734.14(a)(1).

35

Id.

8

of another country is a “deemed reexport” to the foreign person’s most recent country of
citizenship or permanent residency.36 When businesses want to export its products, they must
first identify which agency’s jurisdiction the product falls under. Then, the business must
identify what classification of exports the product is subject to.37
B.

Jurisdiction: Agencies that Control Exports

There are about sixteen agencies that have functions related to exports.38 Three
departments have broad jurisdiction over exports: the Department of State, the Department of
Treasury, and the Department of Commerce:39 The State Department has jurisdiction over
defense related exports;40 The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
regulates transactions in administering U.S. economic sanctions.41 The Commerce Department
has jurisdiction over “dual-use” exports,42 and other exports not identified by other agencies.43
36

Id. at 734.14(a)(2). The EAR also defines other classifications that are similar to exports. See

id. at 734.13–734.20 (defining release, transfer, export of encryption source code and object code
software, etc.).
37

See infra PART TWO (C).

38

JOHN R. LIEBMAN, ROSZEL C. THOMSEN II, JAMES E. BARTLETT III & JOHN C. PISA-RELLI,

UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS §1.00 (7th ed. 2018).
39

Id. at §1.01.

40

Stanley J. Marcuss & Michael B. Zara, A Better Way through the Export Control Thicket,

14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2016).
41

Id.

42

See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2014) (defining dual-use exports as any item that has “civil

applications as well as terrorism and military or weapons of mass destruction . . . applications.”)

9

Although the agency’s jurisdiction over an export often overlaps,44 for certain “categoryspecific” items, one of these three agencies controls its export.45 Other agencies have
jurisdiction over specific exports. Some agencies, such as the Defense Technology Security
Administration, Export-Import Bank, International Trade Administration, and U.S. Agency for
International Development, provide advisory roles or policy-making roles over exports.46
However, these agencies cannot regulate exports.47 Other agencies, such as Customs and Border
Protection and the Postal Service, serve administrative functions.48
Because so many agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, exporters have been
consistently lobbying for the consolidation of these agencies.49 Exporters, nonproliferation
advocates, allies, and other stakeholders have criticized aspects of the export control system for
43

Marcuss, supra note 40, at 49 (2016) (describing the jurisdiction of various export control

agencies); See 15 C.F.R. §§ 772.1, 734.2(a) (2014) (“Exports under the Wassenaar Arrangement
Munitions List (WAML) or the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex are also subject to
the EAR”). The WAML is an international agreement through which participating States apply
export controls to items set on an agreed upon “Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions” list. WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, https://www.wassenaar.org/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2019).
44

Marcuss, supra note 40, at 49.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

10

being too “rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete,” and inefficient.50 Administrations have considered
consolidation proposals, but no complete consolidation has happened.51 The Obama
Administration attempted to create a single licensing agency and merge the control lists to
harmonize export control enforcement agencies, recognizing the inefficiency of the export
controls system.52 Currently, the Trump Administration is not pursuing agency restructuring in
the same way the Obama Administration did, but is directing trade and export policies, especially
with President Trump’s stance on trade with China.53

50

Ian F. Fergusson & Paul K. Kerr, The U.S. Export control System and the Export Control

Reform Initiative, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1 (April 5, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf.
51

See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Implementation of Export Control Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE (March

08, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/08/fact-sheetimplementation-export-control-reform (describing an initiative that is indicative of President
Obama’s export consolidation efforts).
52

Fergusson, supra note 50, at 9–11.

53

See Anna Fifield & David J. Lynch, China warns of ‘countermeasures’ against U.S. products if

Trump increases tariff, WASH. POST (May 8, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-warns-of-countermeasures-on-usproducts-if-trump-boosts-tariffs/2019/05/08/f45c6cb6-718e-11e9-933130bc5836f48e_story.html?utm_term=.b2e9aaf109c3; but see Control of Firearms, Guns,
Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under
the United States Munitions List (USML), 83 Fed. Reg. 24,166 (May 24, 2018) (to be codified at

11

C.

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)

When mentioning the current status of exports regulation in the United States, a
discussion of CFIUS is inevitable because it has a prominent role in controlling emerging
technologies, but in a different manner.54 Along with the jurisdictions of other export controlling
agencies, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) gave CFIUS
expanded authority to analyze and monitor an extensive range of transactions by foreign
investors in United States companies.55
CFIUS was originally established by President Ford’s Executive Order56 in 1975 to
monitor the rapid increase of foreign investment by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in American assets, specifically responding to concerns that OPEC’s interests
were not economic, but political.57 After the enactment of FIRRMA,58 the president is allowed
15 C.F.R. pt. 736, 740, 742, 743, 744, 746, 748, 758, 762, 772, 774) (consolidating exports
controlled under the USML with the Commerce Control List, an export reform effort).
54

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), DEPT. OF THE TREAS.,

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-inthe-united-states-cfius (last visited on Sept. 20, 2019).
55

Harry Clark, Ten Key Points About CFIUS and Export Control Reform, ORRICK: INSIGHTS

(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2018/08/Ten-Key-Points-About-CFIUS-andExport-Control-Reform.
56

Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975).

57

James K. Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), CONG.

RES. SERV. 1, 4–5 (May 15, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
58

50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2019).

12

to suspend or block any proposed or pending foreign “mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers” that
could result in foreign control of a United States business that would threaten to impair national
security.59
In November, 2018, CFIUS adopted an interim pilot program that expanded CFIUS’s
scope and made effective mandatory declarations.60 Businesses that fall under the scope of
CFIUS have to file a declaration to CFIUS if a foreign transaction is expected.61
In 2016, China invested $18.7 billion in 107 U.S. tech firms.62 In April 2019, CFIUS
demanded that Chinese owners of Grindr,63 a dating app geared toward LGBTQ+ community
members, give up control of the company after the Chinese owners had strategically bought out
the American company.64 Since Grindr keeps a lot of user data and tracks its user’s movements,
many U.S. officials and government contractors’ identities could be compromised.65 CFIUS’s
decision to stop this transaction demonstrates that CFIUS is expanding its view of national
59

Jackson, supra note 57, at 7.

60

Fact Sheet: Interim Regulations for FIRRMA Pilot Program, DEPT. OF TREAS. (Oct. 10, 2018),

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Fact-Sheet-FIRRMA-Pilot-Program.pdf.
61

Id.

62

Sarah Bauerle Danzman & Geoffrey Gertz, Why is the U.S. forcing a Chinese company to sell

the gay dating app Grindr?, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/why-is-us-is-forcing-chinese-companysell-gay-dating-app-grindr/?utm_term=.2f816bf80702.
63

GRINDR, https://www.grindr.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).

64

Danzman, supra note 62.

65

Id.

13

security.66 Since 2018, after CFIUS scrutiny increased, Chinese investments decreased to $2.2
billion for 80 deals.67 The question remains whether a blanket limit on Chinese investments is a
national security interest or harmful to the U.S. economy.
The interplay between export control and CFIUS is significant because it increases the
opportunities for regulation of emerging technologies in the interest of national security.
However, even under CFIUS, the specified goals of national security are elusive. Importantly,
FIRRMA, which bolstered and expanded CFIUS’s jurisdiction and functions, and the legislation
requiring an ANPRM for emerging and foundational technologies were published in the same
statute, the National Defense Authorization Act.68 This statute widely concerns for national
security in a time where technology is rapidly developing. Additionally, identifying “emerging
technologies” under the recent ANPRM will become the “critical technologies” for CFIUS
purposes.69 Meaning, using the term critical technologies in lieu of emerging technologies,
CFIUS will also regulate investments in technologies that this ANPRM finds necessary to
regulate. Therefore, the current ANPRM for identifying emerging technologies has a huge
potential impact on regulation and the public’s understanding of national security.
66

Id.

67

Id.

68

50 U.S.C. §§ 4565, 4817.

69

Kay C. Georgi & Marwa M. Hassoun, Action Alert: BIS Publishes List of Emerging

Technologies That It Is Considering Subjecting to Unilateral US Export Control. Your Company
May Need to File Comments by December 19, 2018!, ARENT FOX: PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 21,
2018), https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/commerce-department-requests-publiccomments-emerging-technologies-export.

14

PART TWO: EXPLAINING THE EAR
A.

What is the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)?

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) regulates the
export of certain commercial products and technologies under the EAR.70 Specifically, a small
percentage of exports and reexports require a license.71 Exports that are regulated are listed in
mainly two ways: through the Commerce Control List (CCL) and through the Entity List, which
details the prohibition or restriction of commerce to certain countries and end users.72 The
difference between these two ways is that through the CCL, the EAR regulates specific
categories of products that require a license for its export.73 Through the Entity List, the EAR
regulates specific “Persons and Entities” from participating in commerce.74 The Entity List
includes details of countries and end-users that have embargoes and foreign trade policy
restrictions.75
B.

EAR Controls

The EAR specifies five facts that determine what obligations apply under the EAR: 1)

70

Overview of U.S. Export Laws, U. OF KAN., https://export-compliance.ku.edu/overview-us-

export-laws (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
71

15 C.F.R. §730.7 (2017).

72

Id.

73

Id. at §774 (2018).

74

Id. at Supp. 4 to §744 (2019).

75

Id.

15

“What is it?”76 This entails the classification of the item and whether it is placed on the CCL. If
the item is on the CCL, then it may require a license.77 2) “Where is it going?”78 The ultimate
country of destination for an export or reexport may also determine whether a license is required
for export.79 3) “Who will receive it?”80 This requirement clarifies the “end-user” of the item.81
Some types of end-users cannot receive exports.82 4) “What will they do with it?”83 This
question asks what the “end-use” of the item will be.84 Exports cannot be sent for certain enduses.85 And 5) “What else do they do?”86 Certain types of conduct, such as “contracting,
financing, and freight forwarding” in support of a “proliferation project” may prevent the export

76

Id. at §732.1(b) (2017).

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.

16

to someone.87 Additionally, an exporter must check to see if the item requires a license under
one of ten general prohibitions subject to the EAR.88
C.

Types of Products Currently Controlled

The EAR’s broad categorization of exports reflects its mindfulness of national security
concerns. Generally, types of exports are controlled under the CCL, which is divided into ten
categories: “0-Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment and Miscellaneous; 1-Materials,
Chemicals, ‘Microorganisms,’ and Toxins; 2-Materials Processing; 3-Electronics; 4-Computers;
5-Telecommunications and Information Security; 6-Lasers and Sensors; 7-Navigation and
Avionics; 8-Marine; 9-Aerospace and Propulsion.”89 These categories are further divided and
arranged by groups: “A: Equipment, Assemblies and Components; B-Test, Inspection and
Production Equipment; C-Materials; D-Software; E-Technology.”90 What is important about
these categories is realizing the EAR’s vague categorizations. Many of these categories may
even already cover emerging technologies in some way, thereby further highlighting existing
inefficiencies in regulations.91 Additionally, technologies under one category may possibly fall

87

Id.

88

See id. at §732.1(d) (listing a brief description of the ten general prohibitions, inter alia, the

exports or reexports of controlled items to listed countries; exports and reexports from abroad of
the foreign-produced direct product of U.S. technology and software; export or reexport to
prohibited end-users and end-uses; export or reexport to embargoed destinations).
89

Id. at §738.2(a) (2018).

90

Id. at §738.2(b) (2018).

91

See id.

17

under another category.92 Given these existing categorizations, it is difficult to imagine how
emerging technologies would be separately categorized.
The CCL also provides a designated acronym that identifies a “Reason for Control.”93
Although a control can designate more than one reason, it seems as though “National Security”
as a reason is a “catch-all” category.94 In the context of identifying emerging technologies, the
question is whether the “interest of national security” will be the same reasons already outlined
in the CCL?95
D.

The Export Control Classification Number (ECCN)

92

See id.

93

See id. at §738.2 (d)(2)(ii)(A) (listing fourteen different reasons that exports can be controlled

and its acronym. AT: Anti-terrorism; CB: Chemical & Biological Weapons; CC: Crime
Control; CW: Chemical Weapons Convention; EI: Encryption Items; FC: Firearms
Convention; MT: Missile Technology; NS: National Security; NP: Nuclear Nonproliferation;
RS: Regional Stability; SS: Short Supply; UN: United Nations Embargo; SI: Significant Items;
SL: Surreptitious Listening). Several of these specifications seem to objectively imply a national
security issue, such as anti-terrorism. However, the inclusion of national security seems vague,
compared to most of the other specifications.
94

Cf. id. (listing fourteen specific categories, of which National Security is not necessarily the

most specific); see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95

See 15 C.F.R. §742.4 (2018) (“It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and

reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the
United States”).
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Businesses have the opportunity to request classifications from the BIS and obtain
licenses for exports.96 In the request, the business describes the product that it wishes to export,
according to the form requirements, and submits that form to the BIS.97 The BIS then provides
an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) if applicable.98 The ECCN specifies the type
of export.99 Each ECCN is either in the CCL, Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of the EAR, and if
not described by an ECCN, then it is an EAR99 item.100 Depending on the ECCN, certain
exports to CCL-specified countries and end-users are controlled, which means a license could be
required if a business wants to export a product with an ECCN that falls under the CCL.101 This
classification process is supposed to be a streamlined way for businesses to obtain licenses from
the BIS.
Depending on the ECCN, exceptions to getting licenses may also apply.102 Exports
outlined in the License Exception ENC,103 do not require businesses to obtain a license.
However, certain encryption technologies or digital forensics require annual or semi-annual

96

15 C.F.R. §748.1 (2017).

97

Id. at §748.3 (2016).

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Id. at §740.17 (2019).

103

Id.
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reports.104 This is a creative way for the BIS to garner information on technologies that could be
used to help form and administer national security policies.
E.

EAR Violations

The EAR provides detailed specifications of the types of violations and sanctions
under the EAR.105 Although violations of the EAR seldom go to court, some cases have
managed to make it through. A thorough analysis of EAR violations and court opinions is
outside the scope of this Comment. However, to illustrate what EAR violations look like in the
judicial process, the following is a brief mention of three cases: In United States v. Ihsan
Elashyi,106 the defendants shipped exports to Libya through Malta. They were charged under the
Export Administration Act (EAA), which authorized the “Secretary of Commerce to issue
regulations prohibiting or curtailing exports in order to protect or further the national security,
foreign policy, or short-supply interests of the United States.”107 In United States v. Zhen Zhou
Wu,108 the defendant exported electronic converters controlled under the CCL to China.109 In
United States v. Geisser,110 the defendant exported F-14 aircraft tires to Iran.111 Interestingly, the

104

Id.

105

Id. at §764.2 (2013).

106

554 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2008).

107

Id. at 492.

108

711 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013).

109

Id. at 21–25.

110

731 F. Supp. 93, 94–96 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).

111

Id. at 96.
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court in this situation decided whether the classification of an ECCN covered the commodity
being exported.112
However, most violations do not reach court. When serious violations occur, the BIS can
take measures to include a violating business onto an export controlled Entity List.113 For
example, in March 2016, the BIS placed ZTE Corp., a prominent Chinese technology
corporation, on its Entity List—barring U.S. exporters from selling to the company.114 ZTE
violated sanctions on Iran.115 The BIS imposed a penalty of $1.1 billion dollars in 2017 before
removing ZTE from the entity list.116 ZTE then violated the settlement terms, received a full
export ban, and racked up an additional $1.4 billion penalty.117
1)

5G and Huawei

Recently, news headlines have featured the Trump Administration’s ban on Huawei.118

112

Id. at 96–97.

113

See supra PART TWO (A).

114

Alex Lawson, History Gives No Clues to Trump-Huawei Endgame, LAW360 (May 24, 2019),

https://www-law360-com.proxy.wcl.american.edu/articles/1163090/history-gives-no-clues-totrump-huawei-endgame.
115

Id.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen, Reed Albergotti & David J. Lynch, U.S. tech firms push Trump to

allow sales to Huawei, set up White House meeting next week, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/19/us-tech-companies-push-trump-allow-
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In January, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) placed Huawei Technologies Ltd., which
is the biggest maker of network equipment for phone companies, on its entity list.119 American
officials accused Huawei of facilitating Chinese spying, an allegation Huawei has denied.120
Huawei is one of the biggest buyers of U.S. suppliers of chips and other technologies.121 The
White House issued a temporary reprieve, allowing sales with Huawei to continue for 90 days;
that period has expired.122 President Trump’s decision to ban Huawei sparked national security
debates.123
some-sales-huawei/?utm_term=.9f355286e0d8 (reporting U.S. tech companies attempts to
receive licenses to deal with Huawei); see also 15 C.F.R. § 744 (2019).
119

Dake Kang, Huawei calls on US to lift export restrictions, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/newssearch/?datefilter=All%20Since%202005&query=huawei
&sort=Relevance&utm_term=.677048c37472.
120

Maggie Millier, Blackburn says China building ‘spy network’ through Huawei technology,

THE HILL (July 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/452060-blackburn-says-chinabuilding-spy-network-through-huawei-technology; Kang, supra note 119.
121

Kang, supra note 119.
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Jeanne Whalen, Reed Albergotti & David J. Lynch, U.S. tech firms push Trump to allow sales

to Huawei, set up White House meeting next week, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/19/us-tech-companies-push-trump-allowsome-sales-huawei/?utm_term=.9f355286e0d8.
123

See Sean Kean, Huawei ban: Full timeline on how and why its phones are under fire, CNET

(Aug. 16, 2019 3:05 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/huawei-ban-full-timeline-on-how-andwhy-its-phones-are-under-fire/ (presenting a timeline of President Trump’s Huawei ban);
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This ban, which is seemingly in the interest of national security, has profound economic
interests as well.124 Despite Huawei allegedly dealing with Iran,125 facilitating spying for
Compare Reed Albergotti, Huawei ban threatens U.S. national security, tech companies warn
Trump administration, WASH. POST (June 7, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/07/huawei-ban-threatens-us-nationalsecurity-tech-companies-warn-trump-administration/ (reporting that U.S. technology companies
informed the Commerce Department that the Huawei ban could severely damage the ability to
develop “new technological innovations, including those needed by the U.S. military”), and
Bloomberg, Google warns Washington that Huawei trade ban risks compromising US security:
report, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 7, 2019, 6:55 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/tech/gear/article/3013599/google-warns-washington-huawei-trade-banrisks-compromising-us-security (reporting that Google warned Washington that Huawei could
make its own modified version of Android software because Google cannot update the Android
operating system on Huawei smartphones, making the technology vulnerable to hacking risks),
with Simon Jenkins, Google’s Huawei ban is good news: tech giants shouldn’t always get their
way, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/20/google-huawei-ban-tech-giantsdonald-trump-blacklist (insisting that President Trump’s actions against Huawei, a company that
has too eagerly dominated 5G technology, will have good consequences and is in the interests of
openness and freedom. “The last weapon against them may be the most cynical: national
security, a stock excuse for bogus authoritarianism. But any reason is better than nothing”).
124

See Craig Timberg & Reed Albergotti, Will U.S. war on Huawei help China end its

dependency on Western tech?, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019),
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China,126 and having secret operations to build North Korea’s wireless network,127 Huawei is the
leading company in the development of 5G technology.128 Banning Huawei effectively put a

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/24/tiny-technology-has-giantconsequences-us-china-trade-war/ (“The U.S. move, based on national security concerns, could
have long-term consequences that would not be in U.S. interests, spurring the creation of new
competitors in an industry now dominated by Western companies such as Qualcomm, Intel, Arm
and others”).
125

Kenneth Rapoza, Further Investigations Show Ties of China’s Huawei To Iran, FORBES (Jan.

8 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/08/further-investigations-showchinas-huawei-broke-iran-sanctions/#2cf969783d6d.
126

Maggie Millier, Blackburn says China building ‘spy network’ through Huawei technology,

THE HILL (July 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/452060-blackburn-says-chinabuilding-spy-network-through-huawei-technology.
127

Ellen Nakashima, Gerry Shih & John Hudson, Leaked documents reveal Huawei’s secret

operations to build North Korea’s wireless network, WASH. POST (July 22, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/leaked-documents-reveal-huaweissecret-operations-to-build-north-koreas-wireless-network/2019/07/22/583430fe-8d12-11e9-adf3f70f78c156e8_story.html?utm_term=.3e5670aae9da.
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How 5G technology could be a potential security risk, CNN (July 23, 2019),

https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2019/07/23/huawei-cell-phone-avlon-reality-checknewday-vpx.cnn/video/playlists/stories-worth-watching/.
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significant stop to its capability of releasing its 5G technology.129 On April 12, 2019, about a
month before an Executive Order banned Huawei, President Trump said, “The race to 5G is on
and America must win.”130 Huawei’s addition to the entity list in the interest of national
security, along with President Trump’s public statements about winning the race to 5G, is an
example of a national security interest that is blurred by an economic impetus.
PART THREE: THE BIS’s ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
A.

Defining Emerging Technologies

The descriptions of products on the Commerce Control List’s (CCL), and the process of
obtaining an ECCN reflect the United States’ interest in protecting national security.131 The
different categories within the CCL also reflect the Export Administration Regulation’s (EAR)
attempt to keep up with technology.132 It is important to recognize the interplay between the

129

Todd Haselton, President Trump announces new 5G initiatives: It’s a race ‘America must

win’, CNBC (April 12, 2019, 5:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/12/trump-on-5ginitiatives-a-race-america-mustwin.html?&qsearchterm=President%20Trump%20announces%20new%205G%20initiatives:%2
0It%27s%20a%20race%20%27America%20must%20win.
130

Id.

131

15 C.F.R. §748 (2017); see also supra note 22.

132

See Daniele Rotolo, Diania Hicks & Ben Martin, What is an Emerging Technology?, SCI.

POL’Y RES. UNIT (July, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2743186
(discussing the difficulty of defining an emerging technology. “Yet, as an area of study,
emerging technologies lacks key foundational elements, namely a consensus on what classifies a
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CCL’s current broad categories, and this ANPRM’s even broader categorization.133 The
ANPRM’s approach to simply name broad classifications of technologies, such as artificial
intelligence or data analytics technology, may be so broad as to be a hindrance to innovation.134
The Act lacks a narrowly tailored approach, along with specified applications of technology that
pose a risk to national security.135
The National Defense Authorization Act’s call upon the agencies to create an interagency
process for identifying emerging technologies to update the CCL in the interest of national
security is not a surprise, but a continued effort in bolstering U.S. national security.136 The
portion within the National Defense Authorization Act that addresses the identification of
emerging technologies is commonly called the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), a statute
that allows the regulation of emerging technologies.137 Along with ECRA, the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)—which gave the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) an even more significant role138—was also passed as

technology as ‘emergent’ and strong research designs that operationalize central theoretical
concepts”).
133

See supra PART TWO (C).

134

See supra note 24.

135

15 C.F.R. §744.

136

50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019).

137

50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018).

138

See supra PART ONE (C).
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part of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act.139 To reiterate, both ECRA and FIRRMA
were passed in the National Defense Authorization Act.140
B.

Comments submitted to the ANPRM

In response to the ANPRM, businesses and tech companies have made submitted
comments public. Businesses have detailed various concerns and suggestions surrounding the
identification of emerging technologies.141 These comments contain many overlapping ideas
regarding how to identify and regulate emerging technologies. Analyzing these comments
provides a business perspective on the problem of identifying emerging technologies. Although
a thorough analysis of these public comments is outside the scope of this Comment, it is
particularly valuable to highlight and entertain some of the comments’ considerations.
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) expressed concern that export controls
should not impede or undermine the U.S. innovation and technology base.142 SIA asserts that
139

See supra PART ONE (C); see also The Export Control Reform Act and Possible New

Controls on Emerging and Foundational Technologies, AKIN GUMP: INSIGHTS (Sept. 12, 2018)
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/the-export-control-reform-act-of-2018-andpossible-new-controls.html.
140

50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019).

141

See, e.g., infra note 142.

142

Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Advanced Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking regarding Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, SIA (Jan. 10,
2019), https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BIS-ANPRM-onemerging-technology-jan-10.pdf. The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) is a trade
association representing the semiconductor industry in the United States. The global market is
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maintaining a strong “semiconductor research, design, manufacturing and supplier base is, in
itself, a national security issue . . .”143 Additionally, SIA emphasizes that proposed rules should
be in accordance with the standards already set forth in ECRA, which states that unilateral
controls should be rare and be used as a response to specific emergency situations essential to
our national security.144
Business Roundtable’s comment addresses the ANPRM with particular attention to
ECRA’s policy statement, focusing on four primary goals:145 to adopt narrow a approach, to

concentrated in a few major countries; the U.S. holds 50 percent of the global market share. See
id.
143

Id.; see also COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

ENSURING LONG-TERM U.S. LEADERSHIP IN SEMICONDUCTORS (Jan. 2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_
long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf (“Cutting-edge semiconductor technology is
also critical to defense systems and U.S. military strength, and the pervasiveness of
semiconductors makes their integrity important to mitigating cybersecurity risk”).
144

SIA supra note 142.

145

Business Roundtable Comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)

regarding the Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Jan.
12 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-comments-on-the-advancenotice-of-proposed-rulemaking-anprm-regarding-the-review-of-controls-for-certain-emergingtechnologies. The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers. The
members of the Business Roundtable together employ more than 15 million people and have
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avoid unilateral controls, to coordinate with “allies and other countries,” and to consistently and
closely consult industries throughout the rulemaking and implementation process.146
Along with suggesting that controls on emerging technologies should be narrow and
should avoid hindering innovation, IBM’s comment suggests several policy questions to help
identify an emerging technology:147 Is the technology really a new and distinctly novel
technology?148 Is the technology growing and evolving?149 Is the technology widely available,
and will controls actually help prevent access to the technology?150 Do only a select few have
the capability to further develop the technology?151 Is it challenging to reverse engineer the
technology, given the state of knowledge?152 Although these questions are vast, they reaffirm
more than $7 trillion in annual revenues. See id; see also About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE,
https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
146

BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 145.

147

IBM Comments to U.S. Department of Commerce on Export Controls for Emerging

Technologies, IBM: THINK POLICY (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/technology-export-control/. IBM is a leading business in
innovation and technology. It offers many brands and services that offer AI technology, cloud
technology, cyber-security innovations, and various consumer products. See id; see also About
IBM, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/ibm/us/en/?lnk=fab (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
148

IBM: THINK POLICY, supra note 147.

149

Id.

150

Id.
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Id.
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Id.

29

the difficulty in identifying an emerging technology.153 IBM believes that the fourteen
categories established in the ANPRM are exceptionally broad.154 “A large majority of the list is
merely a combination of mature technologies used jointly with commercial and open source
software from around the world.”155
C.

Addressing National Security

The ANPRM’s call to identify emerging technologies in the interest of national security
is not surprising; however, it is inadequate because it fails to provide information of what
national security means.156 The Department of Homeland Security identified steps for the
advancement of emerging technologies and national security during its 2018 Analytic Exchange
Program.157 Although these steps offer important footsteps toward business and government
153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id. For example, “Certain forms of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are widely

available technologies that have been incorporated into numerous commercial products for
decades. . . . These products perform speech recognition and natural language processing in an
open domain environment. AI building blocks, such as these, have been taught in academic
institutions for decades making them – at a high level – poor candidates for consideration as an
‘emerging technology.’” Id.
156

50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019).

157

See DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1, 3–

4 (July 26, 2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_Emerging_Technology_and_Nat
ional_Security.pdf (suggesting the need to “incentivize investors and corporations to consider
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collaboration, the steps lack collaboration with businesses specifically in identifying national
security objectives. Instead, it relies on promising a fostering environment for the development
of innovation, but essentially asks for a stream of information on emerging technologies.158
Doing so excludes businesses from affecting what national security means, and therefore,
effective emerging technology regulation.
PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Conduct a New Rulemaking

Concerns for national security, especially in the context of technology, are not new.
However, recently, discussions of bolstering national security have happened in the context of it
being developed in conjunction with the development of emerging technologies.159 Additionally,
the ANPRM did not separately analyze national security from a business’s perspective. Because
of this miniscule jump of understanding, or rather an assumption based on an understanding of
the meaning of national security, it seems that the ANPRM and other governmental policy
discussions revolve around the protection of national security in spite of the development
emerging technologies.160 Businesses may feel an inherent lack of need to comply with
national security,” to address “competitive threats” and “share national security concerns,” to
form “strategic public-private partnerships” with an effort to allocate capital to support national
security, and to ensure that the U.S. “continuously maintains a competitive advantage on global,
economic, technological, and geopolitical stages”).
158

Id.

159

See supra PART THREE (B), (C).

160

See Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Advanced Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking regarding Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, SIA 1, 2–4 (Jan.
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regulations that are found upon such a loose term, especially if regulation procedures would
hinder innovation.161
The ANPRM vaguely asked for comment on how to identify emerging technologies that
are important to national security.162 While the BIS should have initially provided a list of
national security concerns with examples of technologies that could impair U.S. national
security, instead the phrase national security is left to speculation and imagination.163 Therefore,
10, 2019), https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BIS-ANPRM-onemerging-technology-jan-10.pdf (suggesting that the ANPRM should justify how each identified
emerging technology is essential to U.S. national security, demonstrating with specificity why a
unilateral control for an emerging technology is necessary).
161

See Advancing an Innovation Agenda for America, BUS. ROUNDTABLE,

https://www.businessroundtable.org/advancing-an-innovation-agenda-for-america (last visited
on Aug. 18, 2019) (quoting JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, chairman of Business
Rountable, “Securing a prosperous future in the United States depends on business and
government working together to protect networks, safeguard data and meeting the sophistication
and relentlessness of our adversaries”).
162

15 C.F.R. §744 (2019).

163

For example, it is hard for an objective observer to discern the controls on Huawei and other

technologies as anything but an impetus to control trade policies or gain a market advantage;
following that perspective, a technology may fall under the need for regulation, even though it
may not necessarily need regulation. See supra PART TWO (E)(1), note 129 and accompanying
text; but see supra 123. Because of this lack of clarity in what national security concerns are,
businesses and exporters may not be able to identify technologies that would perhaps raise
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the Commerce Department should conduct another ANPRM and seek comment on what
businesses think how national security concerns arise in its products and exports.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)’s ANPRM also is fundamentally similar to the
above discussion of the Department of Homeland Security’s steps. The ANPRM does not
address specific national security threats that are the reason for the ANPRM. Rather, it generally
uses the term national security, almost as a “catch-all” phrase to force regulation of technologies
that are unknown to the BIS.164

national security concerns. See IBM Comments to U.S. Department of Commerce on Export
Controls for Emerging Technologies, IBM (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/technology-export-control/ (suggesting that certain
technologies that would fall under the fourteen broad categories listed in the ANPRM should not
be contenders of being emerging technologies for regulation).
164

The ANPRM notes three general considerations: (i) the development of emerging and

foundational technologies in foreign countries; (ii) the effect export controls imposed pursuant
to this section may have on the development of such technologies in the United States; and (iii)
the effectiveness of export controls imposed pursuant to this section on limiting the proliferation
of emerging and foundational technologies to foreign countries[.] 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (a)(2)(B)
(2019). An interpretation of these considerations makes it seem as though the government has
made the policy of remaining market leaders in innovation as its interest of national security.
See supra note 118. Further, the ANPRM fails to address a process ensuring a clear reason for
the regulation of new emerging technologies. See Review of Controls for Certain Emerging
Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201 (Nov. 19, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 744) (2018).
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In light of demonstrated concerns over the meaning of national security and its
implications for businesses and innovation, the Commerce Department should undergo another
ANPRM, and involve businesses and exporters to define national security in the context of
emerging technologies. Counterpoints for such a suggestion is that allowing businesses to be
aware of national security concerns undermines national security.165 Lots of information would
be classified; allowing certain business owners to become privy to such information is not
practical and could undermine national security.166
A comprehensive analysis of national security as a policy is outside the scope of this
comment; however, another rulemaking phase to clarify national security would help businesses
in the identification and regulation of emerging technologies.167 The BIS could explain national
165

See Nathan Busch & Austen Givens, Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security:

Opportunities and Challenges, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS (2012),
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233#ref11 (discussing many challenges that face the “privatization
of national security functions,” such as the increasing need for transparency, while posing the
question whether private businesses should be held to the same ethical standards as the public
sector?).
166

See id. (“Public-private partnerships can also create proprietary and legal risks for companies.

What assurances, for example, do firms have that [the] government will protect proprietary or
sensitive information? The WikiLeaks scandal underlines that classified national security
information can quickly enter the public domain, damaging the national interest”).
167

See, e.g., Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Advanced Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking regarding Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, SIA 1,
5–6 (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BIS-
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security in three ways, which are consistent with the policies of the Export Control Reform
Act168: First, the BIS should define national security from a business perspective as being a
consideration of market leadership and military technological advances. Market leadership is
important because the U.S. can stay ahead of other countries or bad actors that may use an
emerging technology for an unknown future use.169 If the U.S. does not understand or even have
the technology, then national security may be compromised.170 The BIS could explain this in the
context of 5G technology.171 Further, military technological advances are a national security
concern that has long been recognized.172 However, the BIS could provide examples of
particular military uses of technology, such as unmanned aircrafts,173 which could serve as
ANPRM-on-emerging-technology-jan-10.pdf (asserting the need for clarification on what
essential national security concerns will implicate emerging technologies).
168

50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018).
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See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA

1, 21 (Dec. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-182017-0905.pdf (“Private industry owns many of the technologies that the government relies upon
for critical national security missions. . . . The United States must regain the element of surprise
and field new technologies at the pace of modern industry”).
170

See id.

171

See supra note 93.
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See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 169.
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See Yang Yi, China-made solar-powered unmanned aircraft makes maiden flight, XINHUA

NET (June 30, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/30/c_138270560.htm
(describing a Chinese company that made a solar-powered unmanned aircraft, which will be used
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examples of technologies that foreign militaries are using. U.S. corporations could then identify
technologies that may raise similar concerns.
Second, the BIS should declare technologies that could allow or facilitate cyberattacks as
a national security concern.174 Cyberattacks have persistently compromised national security.
Already this year, countries and bad actors have carried out countless cyberattacks against U.S.
companies and the U.S. government.175 Iran developed a network of websites and accounts that
spread false information about the U.S,176 the Chinese intelligence service used NSA hacking
tools to gather sensitive information,177 and an unknown, possibly state-sponsored hacker tried to
spear-phish three U.S. utility companies to gain important data.178 It seems that cyberattacks try
to either gain sensitive data, or disrupt digital infrastructures. If the BIS were to declare

for disaster relief, reconnaissance, and communication; the company said it would also expand
the aircraft’s application by making it work with 5G technology).
174

See supra PART TWO.

175

Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Crises of 2019 So Far, WIRED (July 5, 2019),

https://www.wired.com/story/biggest-cybersecurity-crises-2019-so-far/.
176

Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., https://csis-

prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/190523_Significant_Cyber_Events_List.pdf (last visited
Aug. 2, 2019).
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technologies that could possibly facilitate cyberattacks as a blanket national security concern,
then companies could better identify related emerging technologies.
Third, the Commerce Department should elucidate which foreign entities, especially
Chinese corporations, will possibly pose a national security threat, using the example of 5G
technology and the placement of Huawei on the entity list.179 The main counterpoint to this is
that businesses cannot be expected to know that espionage, such as the case with Huawei,180 is
likely. However, such an area is precisely where the BIS can provide a list of entities, or even
specific corporations, which pose as possible security threats, relying on threats that have been
recently exposed. Exporters could use this list to then identify possible emerging technologies
that the Chinese, or any malicious entity, may have access to through their dealings.
Additionally, similar to CFIUS, the Commerce Department can undertake a pilot
program to determine the scope of emerging technologies that would implicate national security
concerns.181 Last year, CFIUS began a pilot program that expanded its jurisdiction and
immediately made effective certain mandatory requirements.182 Because the program required
certain businesses to file declarations, CFIUS often did not give clear replies to filings,
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commonly called a “shrug.”183 The Commerce Department can borrow the elements of
mandatory filings and initiate a pilot program that would require certain exporters to file
declarations and provide information about their technologies.
B.

Create a New Committee

The ANPRM calls for an interagency process, considering both public and classified
information, as well as information from the Emerging Technology Technical Advisory
Committee and CFIUS.184 This likely means that, since multiple committees are involved,
information must be consolidated and competing policies must be sorted out. Similar to the
inefficiencies created by exports being regulated by multiple agencies, having a multicommittee, interagency process to identify emerging technologies will make inefficiencies and
complications inevitable.185 To solve these issues, the Commerce Department should create a
single agency that specifically handles the tracking of developing technologies.
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Consolidating the process of identifying emerging technologies should be similar to the
Obama Administration’s attempt to consolidate the multiple export agencies.186 The Obama
Administration attempted and sought to create a single control list, a single licensing agency, a
unified information technology system, and a single enforcement agency.187 It accomplished this
by moving items under the jurisdiction of another agency into the jurisdiction of the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).188 The Trump Administration is also continuing to
consolidate agencies. Recently, the BIS issued a proposed rule that would consolidate several
items on the United States Munitions List (USML), which is a control list of exports intended for
military use under the State Department, with the EAR’s CCL.189 The consolidated items would
receive a new ECCN series, and its regulation would be subject to the EAR’s jurisdiction.
Similar to this consolidation of agency functions, a single committee should develop and gather
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information about emerging technologies. That single committee would then provide the
information to the various controlling agencies, and especially to the Commerce Department.
Admittedly, an Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) already exists.190 From
the description of this agency, the OSTP is responsible for providing “the President and others
within the Executive Office of the President with advice on the scientific, engineering, and
technological aspects of the economy, national security, homeland security, health, foreign
relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of resources, among other
topics.”191 However, despite the existence of an agency whose function seemingly relates
directly to the identification of emerging technologies in the interest of national security, the
ANPRM calls upon an interagency process, specifying the Emerging Technology Technical
Advisory Committee and CFIUS.192 At the confluence of these agencies lies the confusion and
complications.193 Learning from the past attempts of consolidating the entire system of export
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controls, a single agency with hired technology experts and scientists would streamline the
identification of emerging technologies.194 This comment recommends that such a function
should be delegated to the already existing OSTP, or to a newly created committee.
community”), with The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), DEPT.
OF THE TREAS.,
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interagency process to review certain foreign investments in the United States, “in order to
determine the effect of such transactions on the national security of the United States”), and
supra PART ONE (C).
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In addition to the creation of a single committee to deal with the continuous identification
of emerging technologies, the EAR could require reports from exporters that acquire an Export
Control Classification Number (ECCN). Currently, certain exports are allowed an exception
from getting a license, but are instead required to file reports.195 Similarly, the EAR could
require exporters that request ECCNs for CCL items that already exist for technologies to submit
a report about three things: first, a detailed report about the technology that is being exported and
its availability in the foreign market; second, a speculative report about what hindrances in
innovation the company would suffer from various degrees of export controls; and third, a report
about whether export controls would affect the international proliferation of the technology and
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to what degree.196 The single committee designated for tracking emerging technologies could
receive this report, suggesting additions to the CCL as it sees fit.
CONCLUSION
The Department of Commerce must have realistic and clear goals for regulating emerging
technologies. The current ANPRM simply stated that the addition of emerging technologies to
the Commerce Control List is in the interest of national security, but it did not specify or ask how
such an addition would not hinder innovation in the United States,197 nor did it clarify what
national security means. The Commerce Department should issue a separate rulemaking phase
to identify what the national security interests are—in the context of emerging technologies—
and perhaps create a new committee that works with leading technology companies to
continuously identify emerging technologies. These two recommendations, in conjunction with
initiating a pilot program and innovative controls that require reporting, would help the
government and businesses solve the emerging technologies and national security conundrum.
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